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Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether and how individuals change formal 
institutions governing an organization. The focus is on formal rules prescribing individual 
cooperation to achieve a collective goal. Our analysis accounts for the role of social norms 
and individuals’ social values. We observe that prosocial individuals –who value cooperation 
and have a conflict between this value and existing rules allowing for low cooperation– 
attempt to change this rule. In line with our theoretical discussion, we also find that prosocial 
individuals first try to change the institutional environment by changing social norms. If this 













An organization is an environment where institutions play an important role in structuring 
members’ behavior.1 In this article, we combine notions from economics, sociology and 
psychology to investigate institutional change within organizations. We consider both formal 
institutions (like formal rules) and informal institutions (like social norms)2,3 and employ 
Ostrom’s (1990: 140) definition of institutional change as “A change in any rule affecting the 
set of participants, the set of strategies available to participants, the control they have over 
outcomes, the information they have, or the payoffs”. In particular, we study whether and 
how individuals change the formal rules of their organization. We focus specifically on the 
roles of pre-existing formal rules, social norms, and social values in the process of this 
change.  
In line with both the bounded rationality perspective and analytical sociology, our 
conceptual framework is based on the assumption that individuals act in ways to find optimal 
outcomes while being constrained or enabled by rules, norms and values. In other words, our 
starting point is that (institutional) structure and agency are not opposing forces but, instead, 
																																								 																				
1 We adopt North’s (1990: 4–5) view on organizations as “groups consisting of individuals achieving objectives 
bounded by a common purpose”. Like Hodgson (2006: 2), we see institutions as “systems of established and 
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions”.  
2 We distinguish between ‘formal institutions’ and ‘informal institutions’ for analytical reasons. Formal 
institutions are typically defined as rules or regulatory policies that are explicitly written down and enforced, 
either by third-party sanctions or by the organization itself. Informal institutions are social norms, prescribing 
the expected appropriate behavior in a specific situation, and they are informally enforced through (social) 
rewards or punishment by peers (Elster 1989). These are institutions type 3 and 4 in Voigt’s (2018) recent 
article on informal institutions (Table 1: 3).  
3 Henceforth, we use ‘formal rules’ and ‘social norms’ when referring to formal institutions and informal 
institutions within organizations, respectively. 
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interdependent and mutually constitutive (e.g. Giddens, 1984), and that “the interplay of both 
is required to understand how institutions are formed and sustained” (Hodgson, 2006: 19).  
The environment we consider is one where a team of individuals needs to cooperate in order 
to achieve a collective outcome that benefits them all.4 The benefits of the collective outcome 
are available to everyone in the team, independent of the individual cooperation decision. 
Hence the team faces a social dilemma. 
Our framework combines three levels of analysis. First, we investigate the effects of 
institutional structure on agency (the ‘macro-to-micro link’: Coleman, 1990) by focusing on 
how formal rules affect behavioral outcomes. The formal rules we consider are ‘cooperation 
rules’ which prescribe individual cooperation to achieve a team’s collective goal. In this way, 
organizational rules may guide and structure the interaction within teams (Sewell, 1998). On 
the one hand, such rules might prescribe cooperative behavior towards a common goal. On 
the other hand, the rules might be lenient and allow individual team members to free ride on 
the cooperative behavior by others, leading to a breakdown of cooperation (Olson, 1965). To 
account for both possibilities, our framework distinguishes between two organizational 
environments that vary with respect to the extent of mandatory cooperation (i.e., the extent to 
which an existing rule leaves the decision to act cooperatively at the discretion of the 
individual).  
 Second, we examine agency by focusing on interactions at the individual and team 
levels (the ‘micro-to-micro link’: Coleman, 1990). We assign an important role to individual 
social values in exploring these micro-level dynamics. These values have been argued to be 
important (e.g. Parsons, 1966) and ‘socially meaningful’, because they connect individuals 
with social structures (Hitlin and Pinkston, 2013: 320).  
																																								 																				
4 Of course, many organizations are more complex than teams. We choose the simplest form of an organization, 
in order to provide a benchmark for further investigation under more complex organizational structures. 
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 Finally, we investigate the role of agency on institutional structure (the ‘micro-to-
macro link’: Coleman, 1990) by looking at the effect of micro-level interactions on 
institutional changes from an existing formal cooperation rule to a new one.  
The research centers on a laboratory experiment. The experimental approach enables 
us to disentangle formal rules, social norms, social values, and the underlying mechanisms of 
institutional change (Jackson and Cox, 2013). In particular, the experimental approach 
provides us with tools to eliminate confounding variables that hinder causal inferences in 
natural settings.  
Our study relates to the existing experimental literature on sanctioning and rewarding 
systems in social dilemmas. Like ours, this literature addresses both first- and second-order 
social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990). It argues that when a group faces a social dilemma there is a 
potential role for an institution to promote cooperation. The success of the institution often 
depends on individual efforts, however, like the willingness to punish free riders. This is what 
may create a second-order dilemma, where individuals can free ride in the hope that others 
will make the effort required for the institution to work. The main focus of this literature is on 
enforcement mechanisms, such as formal and informal systems of sanctioning and rewarding, 
which can be endogenously chosen or exogenously imposed (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 
Reuben and Riedl, 2013; Sefton et al., 2007; Yamagishi, 1986).  
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, we address a different second-
order collective good dilemma. Instead of studying enforcement mechanisms, we focus on 
formal institutions themselves and the likelihood of them being changed in order to solve the 
first-order collective good dilemma.5 Doing so recognizes an important aspect, which is that 
individuals interacting in social dilemmas do not operate in a vacuum; their actions are 
structured by pre-existing formal rules. Second, we try to unravel the social mechanisms 
																																								 																				
5 See Janssen et al. (2008) for a similar approach.  
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underlying this institutional change by focusing on micro-level interactions, where individual 
social values take a prominent role. Our final contribution relates to the institutional literature 
(e.g., Brousseau et al., 2011; Greif and Kingston, 2011; Kingston and Caballero, 2009). This 
literature distinguishes between on the one hand institutions as rules that are kept distinct 
from their enforcement, and on the other hand institutions as equilibria of the interaction 
amongst individuals. By investigating why individuals follow or change rules, we bring 
together these ‘institutions-as-rules’ and the ‘institutions-as-equilibria’ perspectives as 
advocated by Greif and Kingston (2011: 15). 
  
2. Institutional change  
Structural theories of path dependence have typically predicted institutions to be resistant to 
change, in particular due to the ‘entrapment of actors’ (Pierson, 2000: 253). Agency theories, 
on the other hand, have argued that actors can endogenously change institutions. This is the 
starting point of our study. Note, however, that pursuing institutional change may be costly 
(Yamagishi, 1986). Think for instance of organizational sanctions such as a reprimand or a 
fine (Morrison, 2006), or informal sanctions such as ostracism or derogative reactions by 
other members of one’s team (Nee and Ingram, 1998). It is then not a priori obvious that 
change will occur. This is the situation we are interested in. For this reason, we make the 
initiation of institutional change costly. A first important question, is who, if anyone, is 
willing to bear these costs? To study this, we distinguish between two scenarios. In the first, 
all individuals agree that the rule change is desirable. In the second scenario, only some 
individuals feel this way. 
First, assume that desirability of the rule change is shared by all. That means for any 
individual, that if she were the only one who could initiate change, she would do so. When 
more individuals can initiate change, however, the costs involved imply that each individual 
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prefers that someone else takes the initiative. This then constitutes a volunteer’s dilemma 
(Diekmann, 1985). All agree that an act is desirable, but everyone would like somebody else 
to bear the costs (i.e., initiating institutional change). The question, then, is who will 
volunteer?6 Previous studies have considered, i.a., how volunteering depends on the 
(a)symmetry of costs and benefits of the act or on how cost sharing affects the number of 
volunteers (Chen et al., 2013; Weesie and Franzen, 1998). We look beyond material motives 
and argue that an individual’s inclination to volunteer for a rule change depends on her social 
value orientation and its relationship to the pre-existing rule she wants to change.                          
This takes us to the second scenario, where there is no agreement about the 
desirability of a rule change. Some prefer to keep everything as is, while others want to 
change the rule. In this case, the decision to attempt the rule change no longer constitutes a 
volunteer’s dilemma. We will argue that here, too, social values play an important role in 
explaining who will initiate change. 
In what follows, we therefore first introduce social values and then discuss for both 
scenarios how they predict who will initiate a change. 
 
Social values  
Individual social values (a.k.a. internalized moral norms: Greif and Kingston, 2011) are 
typically defined as people’s generalized beliefs regarding the desirability of conducts or end-
states (e.g., Hitlin and Pinkston, 2013). They are formed through socialization within 
families, friendships, social class, or working environments (Parsons, 1966). It is important to 
note that values and preferences are distinct concepts. While individuals’ value orientations 
																																								 																				
6 For simplicity, we focus on the situation where a single individual can initiate change. This suffices to describe 
the dilemma involved. In our experiment any single individual can indeed initiate change, though whether she 
succeeds depends on decisions by all. 
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capture their general principles that can be applied to a range of situations, their preferences 
may differ depending on particular outcomes, specific actions, or context (e.g., Tao and Au, 
2014). Values may affect one’s preferences or attitudes but are more general than that. 
Relevant examples of values are self-transcendence (‘prosocial’) values, which reflect 
concern for others’ welfare and motivate cooperative behavior (Van Lange et al., 1997). 
When applied to specific environments, these values may lead to social or other-regarding 
preferences as these are typically understood in the experimental economics literature (see 
Brousseau et al., 2011 for an overview). Self-enhancement (‘proself’) values, on the other 
hand, relate to pursuing self-interest and motivate the accumulation of personal wealth and 
power. Values have been shown to be vital in guiding evaluation of alternatives and shaping 
behavioral choices (see for an overview: Tao and Au, 2014).  
Studies in social psychology argue that when an individual faces social values and 
formal rules that are incongruent, she may experience a conflict between the personal and 
social identity, making the shared social identity less salient (Turner et al., 1994). This, in 
turn, may diminish support for the formal rules that embody the social identity. We 
conjecture that this situation increases the likelihood that such individuals will attempt to 
change the formal rules they are subjected to.  
First, we consider the volunteer’s dilemma that occurs when everyone agrees that an 
existing rule should change (but, rationally speaking, no one wants to volunteer to initiate this 
change). Applying the general reasoning from social psychology to this scenario implies that 
individuals experiencing a conflict between their values and an existing rule are more likely 
to volunteer to bear the costs of initiating a change in this rule. If, for example, an existing 
rule leaves the decision to act cooperatively at the discretion of the individual, then those 
with a proself value have no conflict and might refrain from such actions as long as the rule is 
in place. Prosocials, however, will experience a conflict between this rule and their intrinsic 
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value to act cooperatively. We can then expect that it will be the prosocials and not the 
proselfs who will attempt a rule change. More generally, we propose that those with a higher 
conflict between the existing rule and their value are more likely to volunteer in a volunteer’s 
dilemma. Though the prediction that prosocials are more likely to initiate change in an 
uncooperative rule seems intuitive, to the best of our knowledge no previous study has 
addressed the question of how volunteering in a volunteer’s dilemma correlates with one’s 
value orientations.7  
For the second scenario, where only some individuals would like to see the rule 
changed, we again consider the case where an existing rule leaves the decision to act 
cooperatively at the discretion of the individual. Proselfs will typically have no desire to 
change the rule, because it enables them to pursue their self-interest with no restrictions.8 The 
prosocials, on the other hand, are more concerned about the enhancement of joint outcomes, 
which are less likely to be realized under a less mandatory cooperation rule. Such a rule is 
therefore in conflict with their values and this conflict will make the prosocials more likely 
than the proselfs to initiate a change. Hence, also for this scenario, it is those with a conflict 
between the existing rule and their value orientation that are most likely to initiate a rule 
change.  
This reasoning leads to our first theoretical prediction (TP): 
																																								 																				
7 There are many studies showing that prosocials cooperate more than proselfs in social dilemma’s (e.g. 
Offerman et al., 1996; Van Lange et al., 1997). These results, however, do not directly carry over to the 
strategic environment of the volunteer’s dilemma. To see this, consider a group of four players, three of which 
are forced to choose the selfish option (contribute nothing in a public goods game or do not volunteer in the 
volunteer’s dilemma). If the fourth player is selfish, she will contribute nothing in the public goods game, but 
she will volunteer in the volunteer’s dilemma. This illustrates how the private incentives differ between the two. 
8 After introducing our experimental design, we will derive specific conditions on when proselfs do or do not 
prefer to change the existing rule (cf. fn 16).   
	 9	
Theoretical Prediction 1. Individuals, whose social values are in conflict with the formal 
rules, are the ones most likely to attempt to change these rules. 
	
TP1 predicts who will initiate institutional change. At first sight, one might think that those 
whose values are in harmony with the existing rules have no reason to change the latter. 
Recall from our discussion above, however, that values can be different from preferences. 
Those who experience rule-value harmony may still have a preference for a different 
environment because this might make them better off in a specific context. In our experiment, 
values indeed capture generalized principles. For example, a proself value describes a general 
tendency to choose the best for oneself, irrespective of what others do. This is in harmony 
with a rule that allows for low contributions. Still, there are cases where a proself might 
initiate a change to a more mandatory cooperation rule. This could occur, for example, if she 
expects that very few people will contribute under an uncooperative rule, hence she 
anticipates to earn more under a more cooperative rule, even if this requires her to give up the 
option of contributing little. TP1 implies, however, that such rule-change attempts by those 
with rule-value harmony are less likely than attempts by individuals with a conflict. 
We now proceed to discuss how they do so. For this, the social norms governing 
behavior in an organization play a central role.  
  
Social norms  
An organization’s social norms and formal rules form the structure that specifies not only 
how individuals in the organization ought to interact to receive rewards like status or salary, 
but also how they “compete” for the reproduction of those institutions (Rand and Nowak, 
2013: 413). Thus, to understand how individuals with conflicting values attempt to change 
existing formal (cooperation) rules, we need to also take into account how the organization’s 
social norms interact with its formal rules.  
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We thus focus specifically on the individuals experiencing a conflict between their 
individual values and the organization’s formal rules. These are the individuals that we have 
predicted to attempt to change the formal rule (TP1). Following Nee and Ingram (1998: 35), 
we consider two possibilities with respect to the prevailing social norm. Either this norm 
aligns with the individual values or it is in agreement with the formal rule. In the former case, 
Nee and Ingram argue that individuals will typically find a way to circumvent the formal 
rules via “a decoupling of the informal norms and the formal rules of the organization”. Thus, 
both are maintained, but formal rules exist only de jure and social norms de facto. In practice, 
no formal institutional change is needed because individuals informally agree that one ought 
to behave differently than formally prescribed.  
The second possibility is that existing social norms are in agreement with formal rules 
but in conflict with individual values. In this case, individual interactions within 
organizations may give rise to ‘opposition norms’, which are resistant to the formal rules 
(Nee and Ingram, 1998). Opposition norms might undermine formal rules and this leads to 
institutional change. Thus, an individual facing a rule-value conflict, where the prevailing 
norm sides with the rule, has two options. She can initiate a change in the rule itself or she 
can try to make the rule irrelevant by changing the social norm into an opposition norm. The 
former will face more resistance than the latter, precisely because one is not only addressing 
an adverse rule, but also an adverse existing norm. We therefore predict that individuals in 
this situation will first try to change the norm into an opposition norm. 
The attempted change to an opposition norm might fail, however. In this case, 
individuals with a conflict may attempt to change the formal rule directly if they “have 
substantial autonomy” (Ostrom, 1990: 21). This is most likely in organizations characterized 
by a democratic structure where all individuals have the ability and the right to participate in 
rule making (Jacob 2015). In such a democratic environment, an individual can directly 
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challenge an existing rule via voting (Walker et al., 2000). When binding for all involved, 
voting on rule change may provide a successful way to establish socially optimal outcomes 
(Hauser et al., 2014: 220). TP2 summarizes this discussion. 
 
Theoretical Prediction 2.  
a) Individuals who have a value-rule conflict, in an environment where the social norm 
aligns with the formal rule, first address this conflict by attempting to change the 
corresponding social norm. 




Finally, we consider communication as a characteristic of the environment that may affect the 
chances of success after individuals initiate a rule change. Communication plays an important 
role in achieving common goals. Experimental research shows that it improves the ability of 
groups to overcome issues of cooperation (for an overview, see: Ostrom, 2005). Moreover, 
one of the prerequisites for institutional change is the presence of a minimum coalition in 
favor of change (DiMaggio, 1988; Ostrom, 1990). The formation of a coalition is facilitated 
by the ability to communicate not only with the like-minded but also with opponents (to 
persuade them). We therefore propose that any attempt to change a rule is more likely to 
succeed if individuals can contest it through debate, which can be facilitated by 
communication. This leads to the following prediction. 
 
Theoretical Prediction 3. A rule change is more likely when individuals are able to 
communicate than without communication. 
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3. Experimental procedures and design 
The experiment was conducted in June and October 2014 at the CREED Laboratory of the 
University of Amsterdam and consisted of a pre-study (explained below) and a ‘main 
experiment’. 220 individuals participated in the main experiment.9 We have data from a total 
of 215 participants (124 men and 91 women, Mage = 22.62, SD = 3.16). They participated in 
one of 17 sessions of the main experiment, in which they were randomly assigned to one of 
our four treatments cells. Sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and participants earned 
on average €29.30 including a €7 show-up fee. 
 
Procedures and tasks 
Upon arrival, participants were randomly seated at separated computer cubicles, and were 
asked to complete multiple tasks, before participating in two public goods games (PGG1 and 
PGG2). They were informed that the experimental session consisted of multiple tasks and 
rounds, but they did not know how many rounds or which tasks would follow. Instructions 
were given at the beginning of each task.10 All participants received the same general 
instructions, aside from treatment-specific information.  
 The first task measures participants’ risk attitudes by asking “How willing are you to 
take risks, in general?”, with answers on a 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 
10 (very much).11 We measure risk attitudes because an individual’s willingness to take risks 
may positively influence the likelihood of organizational rule breaking (Morrison, 2006). The 
second task assesses participants’ social value orientations using the triple-dominance 
																																								 																				
9 Due to a computer crash in the 12th session, the data for five participants were lost. 
10 See online Appendix A for a translated version 
(https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Gerxhani/Appendix-AandB.pdf). 
11 Dohmen et al. (2011) report high correlation between survey responses of this type and incentivized risk tasks 
like Holt and Laury (2002).  
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measure (TDM; Van Lange et al., 1997). The TDM consists of nine items, each containing 
three distinct outcome distributions assigning points to oneself and to an (anonymous) paired 
other.12 For example, a participant is asked to make a choice between (own earnings; other’s 
earnings) options A=(480;80), B=(540;280), and C=(480;480). Depending on their choices, 
the TDM classifies participants into one of three categories – competitive (in this case, option 
A), self-interested (B), or prosocial (C) . To isolate the rule-value conflict on the one hand, 
from ‘internal’ conflicts between an individual’s values, on the other, we focus on 
participants that show ‘consistent’ value orientations, i.e. those that make the same kind of 
choice nine out of nine times. We therefore categorize a participant 
as consistently competitive, proself or prosocial if all of the choices can be attributed to the 
motive concerned. We measure the participants’ social value orientations twice, before and 
immediately after PGG1, which we refer to as SVO1 and SVO2.  
 The third task measures the social norm, that is a general convention (Miller, 2008), 
of what one “ought to do” in a PGG. We do so by employing an adapted version of the 
method introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013).13 To avoid the measurement of a social 
norm interacting with participants’ decisions in the main experiment, we conducted a pre-
study in which participants were presented with the instructions of the PGG to be used in the 
main experiment.14 We asked the participants in the pre-study to predict which contribution 
to the team project would be considered most ‘socially appropriate’ by indicating a number 
between 0 and 10 points. Any participant who chose the modal response earned 500 points. 
By rewarding an estimation of the modal response, we did not elicit the participants’ own 
																																								 																				
12 We use anonymous RING matching, such that for participant 1 “the other” is participant 2, for 2 it is 3, and so 
forth. For the last participant “the other” is participant 1.   
13 See Voigt (2018) for a call to rely more on experiments in measuring informal institutions like social norms.  
14 The pre-study was executed in May 2014 at CREED with 23 participants. The session lasted approximately 
20 minutes. Participants earned €8.52 on average, including a €7 show-up fee.  
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preferences but rather asked them to match the responses of others (i.e., we asked them to 
indicate what they thought was a ‘shared understanding’ of what one ought to contribute to 
the PGG). In this way, the participants play a coordination game in which they have to 
anticipate the extent to which others rate an action as most socially appropriate (Krupka and 
Weber, 2013). Our norm measure captures two important features of a social norm. The first 
concerns what is considered socially appropriate and the second addresses the social 
consensus (Bicchieri, 2006; Krupka and Weber, 2013).  
 The pre-study social norm was that one ought to contribute five points (out of 10). For 
the norm measurement in the main experiment, we present participants with the same pre-
study instructions and ask them to indicate their own beliefs about which contribution to the 
team project the pre-study participants had regarded as most socially appropriate. Again, we 
provide a 500-point bonus for correctly estimating the pre-study’s modal response. This task 
serves to measure the beliefs held by participants in the main experiment about the prevalent 
norm. Here again, the modal response was five points. Subsequently, we disclose to all 
participants in the main experiment that a social norm of contributing five points to the team 
project had been considered most socially appropriate by those who took part in the pre-
study. This revelation of the modal response serves to create a shared understanding of the 
prevalent norm for the environment of the main experiment, which captures the third 
important feature of a social norm (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
 
Public goods game 
The core of our experiment consists of two public goods game –PGG1 and PGG2– of 10 
rounds each. After finishing the tasks described above, the participants are randomly assigned 
to a team of five for PGG1 (anonymous matching), and remain in this team throughout all 
rounds as well as in PGG2. Participants are unaware during PGG1 that a second public good 
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game will follow. In each round of every game, each individual is endowed with a fixed 10-
points resource, which they can (partially or completely) contribute to a “team project”. The 
term “team project” was purposefully chosen to mimic a simple organizational environment. 
In each round the total team contribution is announced to the team members, but individual 
contributions remain unknown to others. Participants are informed that each point contributed 
to the team project yields a marginal per capital return (MPCR) of 0.4 points to every team 
member, irrespective of their own contributions. This MPCR of 0.4 yields individual earnings 
per round of: 
10 points – # points contributed to the team project + 0.4*total team contribution.  
 
Treatments 
We use a full-factorial 2 x 2 between-subject design. In the first treatment –Contribution 
rule– we vary the formal rule prescribing a minimal mandatory contribution level in PGG1. 
The second treatment –Communication– varies whether or not communication with other 
group members is allowed. 
In PGG1 the Contribution rule is either Rule 2, where a minimum contribution of 2 
points is imposed in each round; or Rule 8, where the minimum contribution is 8 points. 
These formal rules are strictly enforced: participants are unable to contribute fewer points 
than the treatment calls for.15 Note that the Rule 8 environment leaves the participants with 
very little freedom to choose (they can contribute 8, 9, or 10 points per round). As clarified 
below, this provides us with a benchmark to which we can compare the Rule 2 environment. 
After participating in PGG1, we first measure SVO2. Subsequently, all participants 
are given the opportunity to attempt a change of the existing contribution rule (Rule 2 to Rule 
																																								 																				
15 Our rationale for doing so is that we are not interested in the role of enforcement mechanisms on institutional 
change. We therefore keep this aspect fixed throughout the experiment.  
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8, or vice versa, depending on the treatment) by initiating a call to vote. This is implemented 
by asking the participants to indicate “yes” or “no” to the question of whether they would like 
to call for a vote to change the existing contribution rule. In line with our theoretical 
discussion, a single individual ‘volunteering’ to initiate the vote suffices. The initiation of a 
vote costs 10 points, irrespective of others’ decisions. This amount reflects the observation 
that challenging an existing rule in the world outside of the laboratory is costly. If no team 
member calls for a vote, no voting procedure takes place and the minimum contribution level 
of PGG1 stays in place. If at least one team member initiates a call to vote –which is our 
measure of rule-change attempt– then a voting procedure starts, where the minimum 
contribution level of PGG2 is decided by majority rule (three out of five votes in favor of the 
change are required). Our measure of an actual rule change is thus defined as the switch from 
the rule implemented in the PGG1 to the opposing contribution rule. 
In the treatments with communication, team members are allowed to communicate for 
90 seconds through a chat box before the actual vote takes place. Participants are informed 
about this chat opportunity before they are given the possibility to call for a vote. In the 
treatments without communication, participants do not receive any additional information 
and vote without the possibility to communicate beforehand.  
After a call to vote and the voting itself, PGG2 starts, with the same contribution rule 
as before if there was no call to vote or if the change option was rejected by a majority, and 
with a new contribution rule if there was a call for vote and if the majority supported the 
change.  
Each session concludes with a short questionnaire on the participants’ socio-
demographic characteristics. The experimenter then calls each participant separately to the 











Participants are paid in cash privately at the end of each session. Earnings are in “points” and 
exchanged for euros at a rate of €1 per 100 points. Earned points consist of: a possible bonus 
for the norm measurement; one randomly determined choice for each of the SVO measures; 
points earned in PGG1 and PGG2; and (negative) points if they initiated a call to vote.  
 
Testable hypotheses 
The theoretical predictions presented in the previous section straightforwardly yield 
hypotheses (H) that can be tested with the data from our experiment.16 As argued above, we 
																																								 																				
16 Recall that we distinguished between two scenarios, depending on whether or not all participants agree that 
change is desirable. Here we show that proselfs may or may not want to change from Rule 2 to Rule 8 in our 
experiment. Proselfs will want to change if they expect to obtain a higher payoff under Rule 8. Using the 
parameters of our experiment, assume that a proself expects the four co-members to contribute on average x 
under Rule 2 and on average 8 under Rule 8. She herself will contribute nothing under Rule 2 and 8 under Rule 
8. Her expected earnings under Rule 2 are then 10 + 0.4*4*x. Under Rule 8, she expects to earn 2 + 
0.4*5*8 =18. She will prefer not to change the rule whenever 10+1.6*x > 18, or x > 5. This means that the call 
to vote constitutes a volunteer’s dilemma whenever the proselfs expect the others to contribute on average less 
than 5. This also means that no volunteer’s dilemma is involved if the proselfs expect others to adhere to the 
norm of contributing 5. 
	 





















categorize those participants with consistently proself or prosocial choices as experiencing a 
conflict.  
 
H1 (based on TP1). 
In Rule 2, consistent prosocials are more likely to call for a vote than all others. In Rule 8, 
consistent proselfs are more likely to call for a vote than all others.  
 
Note that we are not arguing that the proselfs (prosocials) never have a conflict in Rule 2 
(Rule 8). For example, our discussion following Theoretical Prediction 1 (applied to the 
experimental environment in fn. 16) makes clear when proselfs might want to change Rule 2. 
Like TP1, H1 is a comparative static prediction comparing the likelihood of rule change 
attempt between the types. 
 
H2 (based on TP2). 
a) In Rule 2, consistent prosocials will first try to change the existing norm to higher 
contributions than five.17  
b) If their norm-change attempt does not succeed, consistent prosocials will call for a vote. 
 
H3 (based on TP3). 











Our two measures of social value orientations allow us to assess whether social values are 
affected by interactions and behavioral outcomes in PGG1. Of the 215 participants, 174 
(81%) were categorized equally at time 1 (SVO1) and time 2 (SVO2). For this reason, we 
base our analyses on the first measure, SVO1.  
 Our categorization reveals that no participant made competitive choices, leaving only 
prosocials and proselfs. 20 participants (9.3%) remain uncategorized because they made 
fewer than six consistent choices. As is customary when applying this SVO measure 
(Stouten, De Cremer, and Van Dijk 2005), these participants are not considered in the 
analyses. This leaves us with a total of 195 participants (112 men and 83 women, Mage = 
22.65, SD = 3.24). Of these, 94 (48.2%) are consistently proself and 52 (26.7%) are 
consistently prosocial.  
We created a variable Conflict between social values and the existing contribution 
rule, that indicates when a participant’s value orientation is opposite to what the rule requires. 
Table 1 summarizes how this variable is created, and shows that 28 (23.5%) out of 119 
participants in the Rule 2 treatment have a value-rule conflict. These participants are 
consistently prosocial while the formal rule is ‘proself’. In comparison, 34 (44.7%) out of 76 
participants in the Rule 8 treatment have a consistent proself value orientation while facing a 
‘prosocial’ formal rule. We find no significant differences between the fractions of consistent 
proselfs (and prosocials) in Rule 2 versus Rule 8 (Fisher exact test, p = .177).  
 
																																								 																				
18 See online Appendix B for a discussion of the socio-demographics of our participants 
(https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Gerxhani/Appendix-AandB.pdf). 
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Table 1. Value-Rule conflict 
 
     
Rule Norm Social value Value-rule conflict Conflict 
category 
 (Rule 2)   Consistently Prosocial Yes (N = 28) 1 
Low level 
contribution 5 Consistently Proself No (N = 60) 3 
(N = 119) 
 
No Consistent Social Value  No (N = 31) 3 
   
 
 (Rule 8) 
 
Consistently Prosocial  No (N = 24) 3 
High level 
contribution 5 Consistently Proself Yes (N = 34) 2 
 (N = 76)   No Consistent Social Value No (N = 18) 3 
Note: The final column assigns individuals into one of three categories: (1) prosocial individuals with a value-
rule conflict because they have a consistent value (column 3) that conflicts with the Rule 2 (column 1); (2) 
proself individuals with a value-rule conflict because they have a consistent value (column 3) that conflicts with 
the Rule 8 (columns 1); and (3) participants without a value-rule conflict. Participants who cannot be classified 
as either prosocial or proself (N = 20) are not included.  
 
Social norm 
Because we make the social norm of contributing five points common knowledge, the 
aggregate group contributions revealed at the end of a round in PGG1 provides participants 
with a first indication of the extent of norm compliance in the team. Those who do not 
conform to the social norm might be signaling a desire for an alternative norm (Knight and 
Ensminger, 1998). We therefore consider individual contributions in the first round as a 
signal to the team members of behavior that deviates from the shared norm. We thus measure 
norm-change attempts as first-round individual contributions in excess of the norm of five 
points.19  
The norm of contributing five points was correctly estimated by 30% of the pre-study 
participants.20 An individual’s belief about the prevalent norm is not affected by her own 
																																								 																				
19 In the Rule 2 treatment we consider upward deviations from five points because of our focus on a rule change 
from a minimum contribution of two to eight points. In Rule 8 our focus is on a rule change from eight to two 
points. As mentioned above, downward deviations from five are not possible due to strict rule enforcement. 
20 Online Appendix B shows the distribution of these estimates.	
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values; though prosocials report a slightly higher norm (M = 6.58, SD = 2.01) than proselfs 
(M = 6.43, SD = 2.31), the difference is far from statistical significance (two-tailed Mann-
Whitney, z = –0.912, p = .362). 
 
4.2. Institutional Change 
Values  
Our analysis begins with a test of H1, which predicts that consistent prosocials are most 
likely to attempt to change Rule 2 while consistent proselfs are most likely to try to change 
Rule 8.  
We start with the Rule 2 treatment to investigate whether having a conflict affects the 
likelihood of calling for a vote to change Rule 2 to Rule 8. Table 2 provides the results of a 
logistic regression of the call to vote on being consistently prosocial (that is, having a value-
rule conflict), risk attitude, gender and age. The results reveal that a value-rule conflict is a 
strong and significant predictor of a rule-change attempt from Rule 2 to Rule 8 (second and 
third column). None of the controls has a significant effect on the call to vote. 
Table 2. Rule-change attempts 
 
Rule 2 SE Rule 8 SE 
Conflict (consistently 
prosocial) 
.976* .463 .775 1.187 
Risk     .200 .130 1.817** .639 
Age   –.055 .069 –.021 .198 
Gender = Female     .541 .413 2.460 1.361 
Constant   –.909 1.788 –17.142 7.051 
N 119   79 
Nagelkerke R2   8.6%   50.7% 
Notes: In Rule 2 (8) the consistently prosocial (proself) have a conflict.  
*/** p < 0.05/p < .01 (two-tailed test). 
A similar analysis for the Rule 8 treatment shows no significant effect of a value-rule conflict 
on the attempts to change to Rule 2 (forth andf fifth column of Table 2), that is, consistent 
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proselfs are not more likely to attempt change than all others. The regression also shows that 
attempting this rule change is positively correlated with one’s willingness to take risks. 
 The results in table 2 show that the role of a value-rule conflict in individual attempts 
to change formal rules depends on the institutional environment. When the latter is based on 
a formal rule requiring a low level of contribution, we find that a value-rule conflict is the 
main driver of formal institutional change. Hypothesis 1 is thus partially supported.  
 
Social norm  
H2a predicts that consistent prosocials in Rule 2 will first try to change the existing norm. A 
norm-change attempt refers to first-round contributions above the social norm of five points. 
We have 28 cases with a value-rule conflict and 91 without (cf. table 1). Of those with a 
conflict (the consistent prosocials), 17 (60.7%) attempted to change the norm, while 34 
(37.4%) of those without a conflict attempted to do so.21 This difference in proportions is 
significant at the 5% level (Fisher’s exact test, p = .048). Therefore, we conclude that 
individuals having a value-rule conflict do indeed attempt to change the social norm first, 
thus providing support for H2a.  
At first sight, one might think that this result simply replicates the known effect that 
prosocials contribute more to a public good than proselfs (e.g., Offerman et al., 1996, Van 
Dijk et al., 2002). This is not obviously the case, however, because there are only two 
possible motivations for prosocials to do so, neither of which can explain what we observe in 
our data. On the one hand, prosocials might unconditionally contribute more than proselfs, 
e.g., for reasons of pure altruism. If this were the case, they would not only contribute in the 
																																								 																				
21 Recall that those without a conflict include prosocials who were not completely consistent in choosing the 
prosocial option in SVO1. It is possible that some of these individuals also experienced some conflict between 
their social value and the existing contribution rule. 
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first round of PGG, but in all rounds. This is not observed in our data. On the other hand, 
prosocials might start to contribute and continue to do so, conditional on others contributing. 
In our design, such ‘conditional cooperators’ (Keser and van Winden 2000) have no reason to 
contribute fully in the first round, however, because they have been informed that the social 
norm is to contribute five points. We conclude that our observation that prosocials contribute 
more than five points can be interpreted as signaling a desire to change the social norm. 
Next, we investigate whether a failed norm-change attempt affects the likelihood of a 
subsequent attempt to change the existing formal rule (H2b). We consider a norm change to 
be successful if groups reach a mean contribution of eight points or higher in all ten rounds of 
PGG1.22 In Rule 2, attempts to change the norm were observed in 25 of the 26 groups. Only 
three groups succeeded in this attempt (12%). Of the 14 individuals involved in these three 
groups, only two called for a vote after PGG1 as opposed to 47 of the 105 participants in 
groups where the norm did not change.  
H2b predicts that individuals with a conflict try to change the contribution rule 
directly via voting, if they previously tried to change the norm and failed. To test this 
conjecture, we only consider teams where the norm did not change. This reduces the number 
of observations to 105. Table 3 provides the results of a logit regression of the call to vote 
(Rule 2 to Rule 8) on the same set of regressors as in table 2, and includes two dummy 
variables and their interaction. The first reflects participants with a conflict (that is, the 
consistently prosocial) and the second captures individuals who have attempted a (failed) 
norm change. The interaction term between these two dummies allows us to isolate the group 
that H2b is concerned with. Including this interaction term means that the first dummy 
																																								 																				
22 We chose this threshold because it implies that the minimum contribution level of eight points is reached 
without a formal rule. This is a rather high threshold, as one could argue that it may take more rounds than ten 
for norm-change attempts to succeed. Note that our choice makes it more difficult to find support for H2.  
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reflects individuals with a conflict who did not attempt a norm change, while the second 
concerns individuals without a conflict who attempted a (failed) norm change. For these two 
dummies, we do not expect an effect on inititating rule change. Indeed, the coefficients are 
not significantly different than zero. The hypothesis is concerned with individuals with a 
conflict who have attempted a norm change and failed. To test the effect on initiating rule 
change, we need to test whether the sum of the coefficents for individuals with conflict, for 
those who have attempted to change the norm and failed, and for the interaction term is 
different from zero. We find strong evidence that this is the case; the null of no effect is 
rejected (𝜒" = 8.56; p = .003). This evidence that attempts to change the rule are preceded by 
attempts to change the norm provides strong support for H2b. 
Table 3. Direct rule change attempts (Rule 2 to Rule 8)  
 
B SE 
(1) Conflict (consistently prosocial) .386 .757 
(2) (Failed) Norm-Change Attempt .0742 .483 
(3) Conflict x (Failed) Norm-Change Attempt 1.058 1.077 
Risk .239+ .145 
Age -.045 .074 
Gender = Female .468 .446 
Constant -1.483 1.956 
(1)+(2)+(3)=0 𝜒" = 8.56 𝑝 = .003 
Nagelkerke R2 16.4%  
Notes: N = 105; + p < .10 (two-tailed tests).  
 
Communication  
Finally, we expected a change of the contribution rule to be facilitated by communication 
(H3). Whether communication has this effect may depend on the institutional environment. 
For example, participants in Rule 8 might feel hesitant to communicate because their wish to 
change it to Rule 2 would signal a proself value (which they may not want to share in a 
‘prosocial’ environment). We therefore considered the two rule treatments separately. To 
fully utilize the individual-level data that we have, we consider individual votes on whether 
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to change the rule (treating the cases where no one called to vote as a vote against the 
change). This approach is based on the idea that the likelihood of a vote in favor of change 
and the likelihood of an actual rule change are highly correlated. 
In Rule 2, 79.7% of the (59) participants in the treatment without communication are 
in favor of a rule change, and 86.7% of the (60) participants in the treatment with 
communication are in favor. The difference is not significant at conventional levels (Fisher’s 
exact test, p = .337). The percentages are, respectively, 7.9% and 2.6% in Rule 8, but again 
not significant (Fisher’s exact test, p = .615). These results do not support H3.  
 
5. Concluding discussion   
We address agency-driven institutional change by experimentally investigating the micro-
processes of individuals’ social values, social norms and actions within the constraints and 
opportunities implied by exiting formal rules. In particular, we consider two formal 
institutional environments that vary with respect to the extent of mandatory cooperation (i.e., 
the extent to which an existing rule leaves the decision to act cooperatively at the discretion 
of the individual). Doing so provides empirical evidence to the macro-micro-macro link in 
analytical sociology (Coleman, 1990). Our results show that formal institutional change is 
most likely to be initiated by individuals who experience a conflict between prosocial values 
and existing rules allowing for low cooperation.  
Moreover, if such individuals with a value-rule conflict face a social norm they 
disapprove of, they start their attempts at institutional change by trying to change this social 
norm. They do so by signaling a desire to deviate from it. Note that attempting a norm change 
by deviating from it is not a priori obvious. This is because doing so may be costly due to 
possible social pressure. In our experiment, deviating from the social norm in a more 
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prosocial direction is costly because of the nature of the public goods game: while the income 
of other team members increases, the deviator’s income decreases.  
The results show that although individuals make many attempts to change the social 
norm, they often fail. When this occurs, individuals try to change the formal rule directly. In 
our experiment this is undertaken by calling for a vote to decide about a rule change. Note 
that a rule-change attempt after a failed norm-change attempt comes at an additional loss of 
income because of the tangible costs associated with it (e.g., in our experiment, these are the 
costs related to calling for a vote). Nevertheless, many individuals in our study not only 
deviate from the existing social norm in an attempt to change it, but also follow through with 
a rule-change attempt after the norm change has proven unsuccessful. The results also show 
that for the few cases where a norm-change attempt was successful, it was rarely followed by 
a subsequent rule-change attempt. This confirms theoretical arguments proposed in the 
literature that new social norms can become self-reinforcing and can render a change in 
formal rules unnecessary (Nee and Ingram, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). Taken together, these 
findings are in line with Hodgson’s (2006) conclusion that while some institutions can be 
self-enforced, others need a more formalized sustainment.  
We do not find evidence that communication facilitates an actual rule change, which 
is rather surprising because communication between team members has been shown to solve 
cooperation problems (Janssen et al., 2014; Ostrom, 2005). In fact, we observe that a 
majority of those voting are in favor of a formal rule change towards more mandatory 
cooperation, irrespective of whether they were able to communicate beforehand. One 
possibility is that participants are familiar with the environment characterizing the social 
dilemma. A call to vote for a change in the less cooperation rule may be informative in itself 
without the need for more discussion. If this is the case, communication will have no effect. 
More research is needed to further investigate the role of communication in this setting. 
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There is an asymmetry in our results across the two formal institutional environments 
that we examine. Rule-change attempts are both more frequent and more successful when 
changing a rule from low to high cooperation than vice versa. Very few individuals with a 
conflict between their proself values and a (prosocial) high cooperation rule attempt to 
change the latter. This result may not be surprising if we consider the nature of the public 
good game in our experiment. A proself value implies acting in a way that maximizes the 
own (economic) well-being. In our study, the formal rule requiring high cooperation ensures 
not only an equal and prosocial distribution of wealth but also high earnings for all. A change 
to a less stringent rule might reduce the earnings even of a proself individual who would 
typically contribute less after the change. This could motivate her to not initiate a change and 
maintain the high cooperation rule. On the other hand, proself individuals will want to reduce 
the minimum contribution level if they expect to benefit from doing so. This will be the case 
if proselfs expect that sufficient other team members will maintain high contribution levels 
even after  the required minimum has been reduced. In that case, free-riding on the 
prosocials’ contributions would be a profitable alternative to being forced to contribute 
highly. The high cooperation rule, however, does not allow the proselfs to collect information 
about others’ willingness to contribute under less restrictive contribution rules. In short, while 
prosocials in the low contribution requirement can contribute above the minimum to see how 
others respond, proselfs cannot contribute less when high contribution is mandatory. This 
asymmetry caused by the rules might explain the asymmetry in our results.  
 We have focused here on institutional change within teams, the simplest form of an 
organization. The laboratory environment allows us to draw causal conclusions on underlying 
mechanisms of institutional change, a task that would be more difficult under more complex 
organizational structures and virtually impossible with observational field data. This high 
internal validity leaves open the matter of the generalizability of our results (i.e., the external 
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validity). Many organizations outside of the laboratory are more involved than teams and do 
not allow for detailed analysis of the complex interactions between values, norms, and rules. 
Our study intends to provide a benchmark for further investigation under more complicated 
settings.  
One line of future research may systematically introduce new features into our 
laboratory design to directly check the robustness of our results. For instance, while we 
believe the public goods game to be a well-suited tool for studying the agency of institutional 
change in social dilemma situations, institutional change might have different patterns in 
other interactive environments. Similarly, our experiment enables individuals to directly vote 
on formal institutional change. Further research should also aim to investigate institutional 
change in alternative decision-making environments. Another line of future research could 
involve moving from the laboratory to the field. This can be done by running field 
experiments along lines similar to our design, or by collecting observational data in the field 
(for example via surveys amongst members of organizations). The latter will not allow for 
conclusions about causality, but their high external validity would provide a powerful 
addition to the causal inferences we have been able to derive from our experiments.  
 Finally, by investigating the interplay between agency and institutional structure, our 
study was able to empirically show that the institutions-as-rules and the institutions-as-
equilibria perspectives “become entwined” (Hodgson, 2006: 21). The main takeaway of our 
study may well be the importance of individuals, their (non)material motives, and group-level 
processes for understanding the evolution of rules in organizations.  
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Appendix A. Instructions Main Experiment. 
 
You are participating in an experiment. In this experiment, you can earn money. How much you earn 
depends on the decisions you make and on the decisions the other participants make in this 
experiment. In addition, you will receive a €7 show-up fee. 
 
During the experiment you will gain points. Your earnings in points will be paid in Euros at the end of 
the experiment. This payment will be made confidentially to one participant at a time. The exchange 
rate used is 100 euro cents to 100 points. 
 
It is important that you fully understand the instructions. For this reason, we ask you to read them 
carefully. In these instructions numerical examples are used. These serve only as an explanation; they 
have no special meaning with regard to the experiment itself. 
 
Talking to other participants is not allowed during the experiment. If you have a question regarding 
any of the experimental tasks please raise your hand. A CREED employee will come by to assist you. 
 
There will be many pages of instructions. You can move from one page to the next by clicking (with 
the mouse) on "next". 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The experiment consists of two parts. We begin with the instructions for part 1. 
Part 1 consists of three tasks. 
During the experiment, we keep you informed about your progress, so that you know which task you 
are engaged in. 
We now start with task 1. It involves answering a few questions. 
 
In this task, there are no right or wrong answers. 
Select the number that best describes how you feel right now. Do not reflect for too long, but give 
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your immediate reaction. 
 
This is the end of the instructions for task 1 of part 1. 
When you've read these instructions, click on "done." When everyone is ready, we will start with task 
1. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 [Emotions 1 Measure] 
 
Please read the following descriptions and indicate how much they are applicable to you right now, 
meaning at this very moment. 
I feel anger 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
 
I feel shame 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
 
I feel guilt 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
 
I feel gratitude 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
I feel regret 





To conclude, we would like you to answer this question:  
	 36	
 
How willing are you to take risks, in general? 
Not at all  O   O O O O O O O O O  Very much 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Everyone has now completed task 1 of part 1. 
 
We continue with the second task of part 1. 
 
During this task you are randomly paired with another person whom we will refer to as the “Other”. 
This “Other” person is someone you do not know and who you will not meet in the future. 
 
During this task both you and the “Other” person will choose nine times between three options, which 
we refer to as A, B, and C. 
 
Your own choices will generate points for both yourself and the “Other” person. Likewise, the 
“Other's” choices will generate points for him/her and for you. Every point has a value: the more 
points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the "Other" receives, the better for him/her. 
The choices of the “Other” do not affect your earnings; they affect the earnings of one of the other 
participants to whom (s)he is matched. However, you can also earn points because you are the 
“Other” for someone else in the lab. 
 
An example to illustrate: 
- You are matched with “Robin”. Your choices determine the earnings of yourself and Robin. 
- Robin is matched with ”Sam’. Robin’s choices determine the earnings of Robin and Sam.  
- Finally, “Renee” is matched with you. Renee’s choices determine the earnings of Renee and 
yourself.  So, the points you earn are determined by Renee’s and by your own choices. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Here is an example of how this task works: 
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   A  B  C 
You get   500  500  550 
The other gets   100  500  300 
 
In this example, if you choose option A you would receive 500 points and the other would receive 
100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500 points; and if you choose 
C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300 points.  
 
You can thus see that your choices affect both the number of points you receive and the number of 
points the other receives. 
 
In this same way you will choose nine times between A, B, and C options. One of these choices will 
be randomly selected to be paid out at the end of the experiment. This holds for each participant. You 
learn at the end of the experiment which of the choices is selected, and how much you have earned 
during this task. 
Before you begin to make your choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. 
Choose the option that you prefer the most. 
 
This is the end of the instructions for task 2 of part 1. 
 
When you have read these instructions, click on "done." When everyone is ready, we will start with 
task 2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 [Triple dominance measure 1 (SVO1)] 
 
For each of the nine situations below, choose A, B, or C, depending on which column you 
prefer the most: 
A  B  C 
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(1) You get   480  540  480  
The other gets  80  280  480  
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(2) You get   560  500  500  
The other gets  300  500  100  
   O O O 
 
A  B  C     
(3) You get   520  520  580   
The other gets  520  120  320  
   O O O 
 
A  B  C     
(4) You get   500  560  490  
The other gets  100  300  490   
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(5) You get   560  500  490 
The other gets  300  500  90 
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(6) You get   500  500  570 
The other gets  500  100  300 
   O O O 
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A  B  C 
(7) You get   510  560  510 
The other gets  510  300  110 
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(8) You get   550  500  500 
The other gets  300  100  500 
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(9) You get   480  490  540 
The other gets  100  490  300 
   O O O 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Everyone has completed task 2 of part 1. 
 
We continue with the third and last task of part 1. 
 
A few weeks ago, other people, who are registered at the creedexperiment.nl pool, participated in a 
study.  Firstly we will describe to you the situation that was presented to them, as well as the choice 
they were asked to make. Then, we will ask you to predict what these people chose. 
Please read the instructions carefully and try to empathize with these participants.  
 
What follows are the instructions that were presented to these participants. These instructions consist 
of several pages. You can start by clicking on "next page". 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Imagine the following situation: 
You are part of a team of five people. Each team member receives an income of 10 points. You have 
to decide how many of these 10 points you want to contribute to a team project and how many you 
want to keep for yourself. Each team member must make this same decision. 
 
The contributions are added up and multiplied by two by the organizers of this experiment. 
Thereafter, the pot is divided equally among the five team members. For every euro contributed you 
get paid 2/5 = 0.4 euro, regardless of who made the contribution. 
 
Your contribution to the team project thus leads to an income increase for the other team members. 
On the other hand, you also earn income through the contribution of the other team members to the 
team project. 
 
Your income (in points) is therefore: 
(10 points - your contribution to the team project) + 0.4 * (total contribution to the team project). 
 
The income of each team member is calculated in the same way, so that each team member receives 
the same income from the team project. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Below three examples are given, where each team member has an income of 10 points per round: 
 
1) You contribute 8 points to the team project. Every other team member also contributes 8 points. In 
total, 40 points are contributed. 
Your income is (10-8) + 0.4 * 40 = 18 points. Also the income of each individual team member is 18 
points. 
2) You contribute 2 points to the team project. Every other team member also contributes 2 points. In 
total, 10 points are contributed. 
Your income is (10-2) + 0.4 * 10 = 12 points. Also the income of each individual team member is 12 
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points. 
3) You contribute 5 points to the team project. Two other team members contribute 2 points each 
whereas the last two contribute 8 points each. In total, 25 points are contributed. 
 
Your income is (10-5) + 0.4 * 25 = 15 points. The income of each team member who contributed 2 
points is 18 points. The income of the other two team members who contributed 8 points is 12 points 
each. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To sum up: each participant may contribute 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 points to the team project. 
 
We asked the participants to indicate which contribution to the team project they found “socially 
appropriate” and  “in accordance with moral and correct social behaviour”. 
 
With “socially appropriate” behaviour we mean behaviour that most people consider as the correct, 
proper and ethical behaviour. 
 
If a contribution decision of a participant (a number between 0 and 10) matched the modus of other 
decisions, this participant received a bonus. 
 
Now we want to know from you what you think the modal response was of this group of participants. 
The modal response is the most frequently chosen response by the participants. In this case, it is the 
modal response given by participants a few weeks ago. 
 






Indicate which contribution to the team project  (a number between 0 and 10) was most frequently 
mentioned as “socially appropriate”. 
 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Before we continue with the instructions of part 2, we will give you feedback on the previous task. 
  
The modal response (the answer that most participants gave) of the participants in the study a few 
weeks ago was 5. 
 
This means that the contribution that is most frequently mentioned as “socially appropriate” is 5. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This brings us to part 2 of the experiment. 
 
Part 2 consists of 4 tasks. 
 
The first and the last tasks consist of 10 rounds each. The second and the third tasks consist of a short 
assignment. 
 
During the first and the last tasks you will be grouped with four other participants. Together you form 
a team of five members. 
 
The composition of this team will not change: you will remain with the same five members in the 
same team for all 20 rounds of these two tasks. You will remain anonymous during and after the 
tasks. Team members are assigned a number. 
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We now begin with the first task. Click on "next" to continue. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The first task consists of 10 rounds. In each one of these rounds, everyone in your team should decide 
about contributing to a team project. This occurs in exactly the same way as described in the 
instructions for the people who participated a few weeks ago. 
 
To summarize, this is what will happen: 
 
At the beginning of each round, each team member will receive 10 points. Every team member must 
decide how many of these points to contribute to the team project and how many points to keep for 
themselves. 
Your income in one round: 
(10 points - your contribution to the team project) + 0.4 * (total contribution to the team project). 
Each team member receives the same income from the team project, irrespective of what (s)he has 
contributed. 
 
At the end of each round you will be informed as to the total contribution of all team members to the 
team project. 
Click on "next" to continue 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In the left hand corner of the screen you will soon see the round number and your total earnings of 
previous rounds. 
 
To indicate how many points you want to contribute to the team project, enter the number (typically a 
number between 0 and 10) in the input field at the top center of the screen and confirm it. 
 
By deciding on how many points you want to contribute to the team project you automatically decide 
	 44	
on how many points you keep for yourself. The number of points that you can contribute to the team 
project is 10. 
 
Once you confirm your decision, you cannot change it. 
After all team members have made their decision, the screen for the next round will appear. 
 
At the center of the screen you will see your contribution and the overall team contribution of the 
previous round. 
In addition, you will be able to see your earnings from the previous round (10 points - your 
contribution to the team project) + 0.4 * (total contribution to the team project). 
 
Finally, a special rule will be applied today: 
In each of the 10 rounds, each team member must contribute at least 2 (8) points. You will see that it 
is impossible to enter a lower number than 2 (8). 
 






This brings us to the end of the first task of part 2. 
 
We now start with the second task of part 2. 
This task again consists of answering a few questions. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
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Always select the number that best describes how you feel right now. Do not reflect too long but give 
your immediate reaction. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Emotions 2] 
Please read the following descriptions and indicate how much they are applicable to you right now, 
meaning at this very moment. 
I feel anger 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
 
I feel shame 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
 
I feel guilt 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
 
I feel gratitude 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
 
I feel regret 
Not at all  O O O O O  O  O Very much 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
For the third task, you are re-paired with another person whom we call the “Other”. This is not the 
same person with whom you were paired in part 1. It is also unlikely that (s)he will be a member of 
your team of five. This “Other” person is someone you do not know and who you will not meet in the 
future. 




Your own choices will generate points for both yourself and the “Other” person. You also earn points 
because you are the “Other” for someone else in the lab.  
 
To clarify, we repeat the example from part 1: 
- You are matched with “Robin”. Your choices determine the earnings of yourself and Robin. 
- Robin is matched with ”Sam”. Robin’s choices determine the earnings of Robin and Sam.  
- Finally, “Renee” is matched with you. Renee’s choices determine the earnings of Renee and 
yourself. So, the points you earn are determined by Renee’s and by your own choices. 
 
Before you begin to make your choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. 
Choose the option that you prefer the most. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 [Triple dominance measure 2 (SVO2)] 
 
For each of the nine situations below, choose A, B, or C, depending on which column you 
prefer the most: 
 
A  B  C 
(1) You get   480  540  480  
The other gets  80  280  480  
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(2) You get   560  500  500  
The other gets  300  500  100  
   O O O 
A  B  C     
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(3) You get   520  520  580   
The other gets  520  120  320  
   O O O 
 
A  B  C     
(4) You get   500  560  490  
The other gets  100  300  490   
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(5) You get   560  500  490 
The other gets  300  500  90 
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(6) You get   500  500  570 
The other gets  500  100  300 
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(7) You get   510  560  510 
The other gets  510  300  110 
   O O O 
 
A  B  C 
(8) You get   550  500  500 
The other gets  300  100  500 
   O O O 
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A  B  C 
(9) You get   480  490  540 
The other gets  100  490  300 
   O O O 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This brings us to the final task of part 2. 
 
During this final task you will be grouped again with four other participants. Together you will thus 
form the same team of five members as in the first task of part 2. 
 
This final task of part 2 consists again of a team project of 10 rounds, similar to the first task of part 2. 
 
Please remember that the rule which applied in the first 10 rounds of the team project was that team 
members had to contribute a minimum of 2 (8) points in each round. 
 
We will now allow you to propose to your team members to vote for a change of this rule into a new 
rule, which ensures that each team member has to contribute a minimum of 8 (2) points in each round.  
Note that voting will take place only if at least one of the team members proposes to vote for a change 
of the rule. The one who proposes to vote bears a cost of 10 points. If several members make a 
proposal to vote, each one has a cost of 10 points. 
  
If no one proposes to vote for a change of the rule, the same rule will apply as before. That means that 
each team member has to contribute a minimum of 2 (8) points in each round. 
 
If at least one team member proposes to vote for a change of the rule, voting will take place: 
- If no majority (i.e. two or fewer team members) supports the proposal, the same rule will apply as 
before, meaning that each team member contributes a minimum of 2 (8) points in each round. 
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- If a majority (i.e. three or more team members) supports the proposal, the rule will change and each 
team member must henceforth contribute at least 8 (2) points per round. 
 
Participants in the Communication treatment read in this case the following instructions: 
If at least one team member proposes to vote for a change of the rule, there is first the opportunity to 
have a discussion within the team via a chat box for 90 seconds. After this, voting will take place: 
- If no majority (i.e. two or fewer team members) supports the proposal, the same rule will apply as 
before, meaning that each team member contributes a minimum of 2 (8) points in each round. 
- If a majority (i.e. three or more team members) supports the proposal, the rule will change and each 
team member must henceforth contribute at least 8 (2) points per round. 
 
Click on "ready" to start with the project team. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 [Call to Vote Measure] 
 




[Anticipated regret Measure] 
 
To which extent are the following statements applicable to your decision to vote or not for a change of 
the rule? 
 
I did not propose to vote for a change of the rule because I did not want to feel bad if the result of the 
vote was not as I want it to be. 
 
Not at all  O O O O Very much 
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I proposed to vote for a change of the rule because I did not want to regret not trying if the result of 
the vote were to turn out in my favor 
 





One or more of the team members has proposed to vote for a change of the rule. 
Therefore you will now vote in favor or against the suggested rule change. 
 
Participants in the Communication treatment read in this case the following instructions: 
Before you vote, you have the opportunity to have a discussion with each other for 90 seconds.  
Below a chat box will appear in which you can communicate for 1.5 minutes. 
During the communication you cannot share your identity. Also you are requested to converse in a 
nice and polite manner. 
 
Please indicate which of these rules you vote for. 
O Every team member has to contribute 8 points each round 
O Every team member has to contribute 2 points each round. 
 
Remember that the majority (three or more members) determines the outcome.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We now begin with the last 10 rounds of the team project. 
 
During these 10 rounds the following rule applies: 




 [PGG2] (same as PGG1) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, we would like you to answer a few questions: 
What is your age?      _____ 
What is your gender?      _____ 
Year of starting your study     _____ 
Field of study       _____ 
Do you have a paid job for more than 2 days a week? _____ 
 
During this experiment you had the opportunity to propose a vote for a rule change. Why did you or 
did you not choose to do so? 
 
“I proposed to vote because……………………………………………..” 
“I did not propose to vote because………………………………………” 
 
Your answers will be treated confidentially. 
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. Please remain seated and do not communicate until the other 
participants have finished this questionnaire. 
 







Appendix B: Additional Information 
Socio-demographics 
We checked all our variables of interest for differences across the socio-demographics of our 
participants. The only significant differences we found are as follows. First, men (M = 6.71, SD = 
1.51) generally reported more willingness to take risks than women (M = 5.94, SD = 1.70), t = 3.358, 
p = .001). Second, age appears to correlate with mean contributions in PGG1 (ANOVA; F(3, 193) = 
4.040, p = .008) and participants in a group of 20- to 23-year-olds more often show proself value 
orientations than in other age categories (χ2 (6, N = 194) = 7.985, p = .046). To correct for these 
differences, we include gender and age as controls in our analyses.23  
	
Norm estimates 
Figure B1 shows the distribution of estimates in the main experiment of the modal response in the 
pre-study. 34% of the participants correctly estimated the modal pre-study response to be five. 
Figure B1. Norm measure. 
Note: Bars show the distribution of answers (in percentages) in the main experiment to the question 
“Which contribution to the team project do you think the participants of our earlier experiment find 
most socially appropriate?”. 
																																								 																				
23 Our results are not qualitatively affected if we exclude the corrections for age and gender. 
